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LÉON ROCHES AND ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM IN THE CLOSING YEARS OF THE TOKUGAWA RÉGIME

1. INTRODUCTION

Léon Roches came to Japan in 1864 as French Minister, and during his tenure of office he cultivated a relationship of special intimacy with the Bakufu. He displayed considerable activity in various fields, diplomatic, military, economic, etc., in an attempt to secure an advantageous position for his country in rivalry with Sir Harry Parkes, the British Minister. His fundamental policy was to support the Bakufu, and he made many recommendations to the Bakufu regarding the reform of its administration. Even after the Bakufu's surrender of power to the Emperor, he continued to support it, so much so that he actually advised the Tokugawas to try to recapture power. He met with reverses, however, and left for home in April, 1868, with his cherished desire unfulfilled.

2. FRANCE'S SUPPORT OF THE BAKUFU

It is a well-known fact that in the closing years of the Bakufu, the Satsuma and the Chōshū clans befriended Britain, while the Bakufu was on specially intimate terms with France. Below, I shall give an outline of the relations then existing between the Bakufu and France.

(a) The campaign against Satsuma and Chōshū. It appears that Napoleon the Third had the ambitious design of extending French influence to the Far East and instructed Léon Roches to help the Bakufu with this object in view. When, in 1864, Ikeda-Chikugo-no-Kami 池田筑後守 and his

party visited Paris, Comte de Mont Blanc suggested to the Japanese Envoy that, if Japan's prosperity was to be attained, the influence of the various *daimyō* (feudal lords) should be curtailed. He added that as this object could not possibly be achieved by the Bakufu, single-handed, France's armed help should be sought. The French Government also gave Chikugo-no-Kami to understand that if the Bakufu desired to repress the rebels at home and maintain permanent friendship with outside countries, France would be willing to help it. This attitude of the French Government accounts for the inclusion of a provision for French armed assistance in a treaty of four articles, concluded by Chikugo-no-Kami with the French Foreign Minister in Paris in May of the same year. As this treaty was not ratified by the Bakufu on the ground that the Japanese Envoy acted *ultra vires* in the matter, it is popularly called the unratified treaty of Paris.

It is also said that when Itakura-Iga-no-Kami 板倉伊賀守 interviewed Roches at Hyōgo, the French Minister urged on him the necessity of bringing the campaign against Chōshū to a speedy end, saying that delay might increase the chances of Britain's instigation, on the one hand, and of the growth of hostility to the Bakufu on the part of many *daimyō*, on the other. He further told him that France would be ready to supply the Bakufu with as many guns as it desired to have and put her warships at the service of the Bakufu, though the sale of warships in the circumstances then prevailing would be impossible under the treaties by which Western countries were bound. He nevertheless indicated the readiness of his country to convert merchantmen into warships and supply them to the Bakufu. From this episode it is clear that France was prepared to supply arms to the Bakufu in order to enable it to achieve the object of its campaign against Chōshū.

The policy of enhancing the authority of the Bakufu by calling in the aid of France to repress Satsuma and Chōshū found supporters among the officials of the Bakufu also. Among its supporters may be mentioned Abe-Bungo-no-Kami

阿部豊後守, Matsumae-Idzu-no-Kami 松前伊豆守, both of the *rōjū* 老中, Sakai-Hida-no-Kami 酒井飛騨守, a *wakadoshiyori* 若年寄, Oguri-Kōdzuke-no-Suke 小栗上野介, a *kanjō bugyō* 勘定奉行, and Takemoto-Haito-no-Shō 竹本隼人正, a *osoba goyō toritsugi* 御側御用取次. These officials thought it a wise policy to subdue Satsuma and Chōshū with the help of France, and then, to follow up the advantages of victory, to curtail the powers and domains of the *daimyō*, introducing a new system of local administration. In this way, they hoped to unify the whole country permanently and effectually under the rule of the Tokugawas. After the retirement of Abe and Matsumae from office, Oguri-Kōdzuke-no-Suke stood out conspicuously among the advocates of this policy.

(b) Military training. In 1862, the Bakufu organised infantry, cavalry and artillery on the Western model, but in view of the very tardy progress made in the training of these troops during the next four or five years, Asano-Mimasaka-no-Kami 淺野美作守 and Oguri-Kōdzuke-no-Suke approached the French Minister, through Kurimoto-Sebei 栗本瀬兵衛, a *metsuke* 目付, about March, 1865, with a request for the recommendation of military instructors. The French Government acceded to this request, and on the last day of September of the following year, a contract for the engagement of Colonel Chanoine and a few other instructors was signed, Flury Hérald, the Japanese honorary Consul in France, signing the contract on behalf of the Bakufu. Subsequently, the Bakufu established a military training school at Yokohama with these French officers as military instructors. In June, 1867, this institution was moved to Edo (Tokyo), a military academy being established in the Rikugunsho (Army Institute), with parade grounds at Etchūjima and Komabano. These military instructors were discharged in February, 1868, however, only two years after the military training was initiated under their instruction.

With regard to the navy, the Bakufu opened a naval training school at Nagasaki in 1855, but closed it in February, 1859. A French naval officer was later engaged, and instruc-

tion in naval arts was started from January 4th, 1866, on board the warship Fujiyama which was moored in the port of Yokohama. On the advice of Roches, who suggested that naval training should be entrusted to Britain on the ground that it was not proper, from the point of view of international courtesy, that France should undertake both military and naval training, the Bakufu suspended the naval training on board the Fujiyama in April of the same year, and in July or August, the matter of naval training was left in the hands of the British Minister.

(c) The supply of arms. In a letter addressed to the *rōjū* of the Bakufu under date of September 19th, 1865, Roches stated his views on the campaign against Chōshū and also pressed the Bakufu for the opening of ports to foreign intercourse. In this letter, he says: "If the Imperial Court withholds consent to the conclusion of treaties, the misgivings of foreign countries will naturally remain, which will render international friendship impossible. In such an event, Japan would be unable to obtain from foreign countries newly invented arms, nor could she hope to get valuable books on strategy or learn marvellous arts of warfare from others. Then, she would be unable to strengthen her army and navy." Yoshinobu 慶喜, the Shogun, in his letter to Roches dated August 2nd, 1866, asked for his good offices in the purchase of guns and warships. In this letter, the Shogun mentioned that the campaign against Chōshū had not been concluded, though it had already been going on for a year, and stated his view that it would be impossible to subdue the clan quickly by means of the naval force only. He then asked him to see that guns, rifles and transport steamers were quickly supplied so that the Bakufu's victory might be assured. In another letter, dated the 27th of the same month, the Shogun thanks Roches for his ready consent to the above-mentioned request and for his prompt communication of this request to his home Government, soliciting the French Minister's redoubled efforts to enable the Bakufu to obtain warships, naval machines and guns and rifles, which,

the Shogun says, are no less important than the training of cavalry, artillery and infantry for making the country rich and strong. As already mentioned, it was the plan of Oguri-Kōdzuke-no-Suke and his fellow-thinkers in the Bakufu to purchase arms from France and secure her financial help, and to unify the whole country and firmly establish the system of the centralisation of power by subduing Chōshū as soon as these arms were obtained. In the "Life of Lord Nabeshima-Naomasa 鍋島直正公傳" appears the passage: "The Bakufu secretly endeavoured to purchase warships and arms valued at \$ 7,000,000 from France, through the intermediary of Roches, the French Minister, with a view to subduing Chōshū with these weapons." It is thus clear that the Bakufu attempted to obtain the supply of arms from France.

(d) The support of the Bakufu. It is said that when Roches was received in audience by Yoshinobu at Ōsaka Castle on February 6th, 1867, he urged the Shogun to fulfil treaty obligations. He pointed out that the failure of the Bakufu to discharge treaty obligations was due either to its aversion to diplomatic intercourse or to its lack of power to carry out its policy. In the former case, the foreign Governments might resort to armed force, while in the latter case they might be driven to make common cause with influential clans against the Bakufu. The Satsuma and the Chōshū clans were already plotting to rise in open revolt against the Bakufu, acting in collusion with Britain. It was, therefore, advisable, he said, for the Bakufu to decide definitely to open the port of Hyōgo and another port as a substitute for Niigata, and also to open the ports of Shimonoseki and Kagoshima in lieu of Edo and Ōsaka, the opening of which should be given up because of the unfavourable popular feelings prevailing in those cities. If the Bakufu shaped its course in this way, the rumour circulated by Satsuma and Chōshū that the Bakufu was against diplomatic intercourse would die a natural death. Again, if the Satsuma and the Chōshū clans refused to open the ports in their respective domains, it would prove their crafty designs. The course

suggested, the French Minister declared, would serve to demonstrate the sincerity of the Bakufu, on the one hand, and defeat the plots of the two influential clans, on the other. His advice was not acted upon, but it shows how Roches regarded the relations between Britain and the two clans and what course he desired the Bakufu to pursue.

Roches further laid before the Shogun his views on both domestic and foreign administration, disclosing what he believed to be the best plan for restraining Sir Harry Parkes, the British Minister, and dilating on the course which the Bakafu should shape in dealing with the Imperial Court. He is said to have accused Britain of contriving to harass the Bakufu by making common cause with many *daimyō*, while representing France, America and Holland as friendly to the Bakufu.

In April, 1867, Roches, apprehensive of the behaviour of Satsuma, Chōshū and Britain, memorialised the Bakufu, urging it to proclaim to all outside countries the Japanese form of government.

On October 14th of the same year, Yoshinobu surrendered power to the Emperor, and in December, the diplomatic representatives of Britain, America, France, Holland, Italy and Russia addressed an inquiry to the *rōjū*, asking which Government would handle diplomatic matters after the change that had just been effected in the Japanese form of Government. At that time, Roches secretly advised the *rōjū* to take the opportunity afforded by this joint inquiry to make the foreign countries recognise the right of the Tokugawa family to handle foreign matters as theretofore, saying that the course was opportune as it was impossible to predict the future turn of events in Japan.

It is said that when, after his defeat in the battle of Toba and Fushimi, Yoshinobu returned to Edo on January 12th, 1868, Roches saw him and strongly urged him to rally his forces in order to restore power, assuring him that in that event France would be willing to supply all the warships, arms and war funds that he might require. The

Shogun, however, rejected his advice on the ground that the suggested course was impossible in the light of Japan's national polity.

From the facts enumerated above, it is clear that Roches was emphatic in his support of the Bakufu.

3. ROCHES'S VIEWS ON THE REFORM OF THE BAKUFU'S ADMINISTRATION

(a) Roches's views on the reform of administration. It is said that during his stay at Atami one winter, Roches invited to his hotel Hirayama-Tosho-no-Kami-Takatada 平山圖書頭敬忠 and Kawakatsu-Ōmi-no-Kami-Hiromichi 川勝近江守廣道—officials in charge of foreign affairs—and advised them to effect the administrative reform of the Bakufu, handing them, at the same time, a written memorial to the Bakufu with a request that they lay it before the Shogun. In this memorial, he advised the Bakufu to fulfil treaty obligations and take vigorous steps to increase national resources and strength. To this end, he suggested among other things, the opening of the port of Hyōgo, the reorganisation of the Cabinet and the improvement of the army and the navy.

On February 6th and 7th, 1867, Yoshinobu received Roches at Ōsaka Castle to hear his views on administrative matters of importance. On the 8th of the same month, the Shogun sent Itakura-Iga-no-Kami and Matsudaira-Nuido-no-Kami 松平縫殿頭 to his hotel to seek his opinion on certain matters. It was on this occasion that the French Minister described the relations between Britain and the two clans of Satsuma and Chōshū, and suggested to the Bakufu the advisability of proclaiming its political position to the outside world. He further set forth his views on the need of curtailing the powers of the various clans so as to establish the system of the centralisation of power, of expanding the army and the navy, of reorganising the Government, and of supplanting the system of paying stipends in rice by that of paying in money. His idea was that the stipends then allowed should

be halved and the other half devoted to the expense of reform. He also suggested that the *daimyō* should be exempted from their military duties, and be ordered to make monetary contributions instead. A commercial tax should be levied on merchants, and a land tax on the estates of temples and shrines. Companies should be established as organs for trading, and mines be exploited for the development of industry.

On the subject of the centralisation of power, Roches seems to have proposed the revival of the *sankin kōtai* 参勤交代 system (under which *daimyō* attended on the Shogun by turns) with a view to curtailing the powers of the *daimyō*, and suggested the unification of the military and diplomatic powers in the Central Government. At the same time, he pointed out the advisability of allowing the *daimyō* participation in the State administration, which, he suggested, should be conducted in consonance with the popular wishes.

His plan for administrative reform was to divide the Government into six Bureaus—the Navy, the Army, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Home Affairs and Justice. Each Bureau, he recommended, should have one *rōjū* and one *wakadoshiyori*, the post of *wakadoshiyori* to be thrown open to talent, irrespective of family status.

With regard to the revision of the method of paying stipends (feuds) and the imposition on the *daimyō* of the obligation to make monetary contributions, Roches set forth his views as follows. One noteworthy point in his proposals is his advocacy of the conversion of *samurai* into farmers and merchants.

1. Assuming one *koku* of rice to be worth 10 *ryō* 8,000,000 *koku* of rice will be equivalent to 80,000,000 *ryō*. In fixing new grants in money to retainers, the sums should be worked out at the rate of five *ryō* per *koku* of rice. As the Government is actually in financial straits on account of the heavy expenditure involved in its national development schemes, this reduction will not cause resentment among its retainers. If this method is adopted, 40,000,000 *ryō* will suffice for the new stipends, and the other 40,000,000 *ryō*

can be employed for financing various enterprises, including that of developing the army and the navy.

2. The *daimyō* in hereditary vassalage should be exempted from the duty of maintaining their own troops, in readiness for the military needs of the Bakufu, and monetary contributions should be collected from them instead. The money thus collected should be used for paying the expense of the army and the navy, the maintenance of which should be a charge on the Bakufu. By this means the *daimyō* can be relieved of their financial difficulties, while the position of the Bakufu can be strengthened. They should be ordered to hand over to the Bakufu all able-bodied men in their troops, and to convert the rest into farmers and merchants.

3. The number of the retainers of the Bakufu should be reduced. While retaining the services of men of ability, the others should be induced to follow commercial and agricultural pursuits.

As regards the commercial and land taxes, he recommended:—

1. Merchants should be divided into four classes, and be ordered to pay two per cent. of their profits as a tax.

2. Temples should also be made to pay two per cent. of their incomes as a land tax.

3. It is a rule accepted all over the world that taxes should be light where the things on which they are imposed are necessities, and heavy where they are luxuries.

With regard to the establishment of companies, industrial development and the improvement of communications, the following suggestions were made:—

1. As the development of trade will help to improve the finances of the Bakufu, which will thus be enabled to meet heavy national expenditure, it is urgent that companies should be established as organs for trading.

2. Various articles are being imported from Europe, but it is to her interest that Japan should learn to produce all necessary things at home. For this purpose, manufacturing machines must be imported. Japan is rich in gold, silver,

copper, iron and other resources, but as antiquated methods are being employed for mining, their production is limited. It is, therefore, advisable for the Bakufu to engage foreign mining engineers and workers for the full exploitation of mineral resources. It is also necessary to secure the services of foreigners who are skilled in the manufacture of woollen cloth and in breeding sheep.

3. Japan has also a plentiful supply of hides, but as people are ignorant of the proper methods of tannirs, they are obliged to import costly hides from Western countries. As hides are necessary for the manufacture of implements of war, it is well for the Bakufu to engage foreigners to teach the art of tannirs.

4. For the purpose of enriching the country, it is of prime importance to increase transport facilities and make good roads. If such facilities are provided at the cost of 100 *ryō*, for instance, the profit accruing from them the next year will be 200 *ryō* at least.

In another written memorial to the Bakufu, dated August 28th, 1867, Roches set forth his views on the need of establishing a Finance, an Army, and other Bureaus. In his proposal for the creation of a Finance Bureau, he made the following recommendations:—

As the creation of an army and a navy entails enormous expenditure, there must be a large revenue to meet this expense. To this end, the following taxes and tolls must be collected:—

1. As the land tax, one-tenth of the total annual expenditure should be collected from houses and shops. The land tax is levied in all European countries where the budgetary system is adopted.

2. Merchants should be divided into six grades, according to the amount of the profits they realise and also according to the kinds of their trades. When granting them licenses for their respective trades, they should be taxed.

3. A tax should be levied on *saké*.

4. A tax should be levied on tobacco.

5. Tea and raw silk should be taxed at sources of production.

6. A toll should be imposed on Japanese vessels of all kinds.

If it is impossible to arrange for the speedy execution of these tax plans, some devices must be elaborated whereby the money necessary for meeting emergency expenditure may be raised. Since the *hatamoto* (direct feudatories of the Shogun) are all loyal to the Shogun and are solicitous of his welfare and enhanced authority, it seems only proper to require them to make contributions towards the expenses of the Government. They should be ordered to donate one-tenth of their annual income to the national coffer. As this is an emergency measure, the period of its operation should be fixed at three years only.

(b) Enforcement of the reform of the Bakufu's administration. The administration of the Bakufu was actually reformed towards the end of 1866 and in the following year. Many of these reforms were inspired by the recommendations of Roches.

In the first place, the *rōjū* were appointed to preside over the five Bureaus newly created. Roches recommended the creation of six Bureaus, but the number of the Bureaus actually created was five. The Bureau of Justice, though recommended by him, was not created. The proper functions of the *rōjū* consisted in helping the Shogun in the conduct of the State administration. Of these *rōjū*, none but the *katte gakari* 勝手掛, the *gaikoku gakari* 外國掛 and the *kairikugun sōsai* 海陸軍總裁 was trusted with any particular branch of administration. All administrative matters were decided by their counsels. The office of *katte gakari* had been in existence for many years, but that of *gaikoku gakari* was created in 1856, while that of *kairikugun sōsai* was brought into existence in 1862, though this office was left vacant after October of 1865. In pursuit of his new policy of appointing *rōjū* to the different branches of administration, the Shogun first appointed Matsudaira-Nuido-no-Kami

rikugun sōsai 陸軍總裁 (President of the Army Bureau) and Inaba-Hyōbu-Dayū 稻葉兵部大輔 *kaigun sōsai* 海軍總裁 (President of the Navy Bureau) on December 28th, 1866. In May, 1867, he appointed Inaba-Mino-no-Kami 稻葉美濃守 *kokunai jimu sōsai* 國內事務總裁 (President of the Home Affairs Bureau), Matsudaira-Suō-no-Kami 松平周防守 *kaikei sōsai* 會計總裁 (President of the Finance Bureau), Ogasawara-Iki-no-Kami 小笠原壹岐守 *gaikoku jimu sōsai* 外國事務總裁 (President of the Foreign Affairs Bureau). The Cabinet of the Tokugawa Bakufu was thus reorganised on the Western model.

Next, high offices were thrown open to men of talent. Under the previous system, the office of *wakadoshiyori* was open to such *samurai* only as held a fief of 10,000 *koku* of rice or more. This rule was departed from for the first time in February, 1867, when Nagai-Genba-no-Kami 永井玄蕃頭, an *ōmetsuke*, was appointed acting *wakadoshiyori* (being made a regular *wakadoshiyori* on December 15th). In April of the same year, Asano-Mimasaka-no-Kami, acting *rikugun bugyō* 陸軍奉行, and Hirayama-Tosho-no-Kami, a *gaikoku bugyō* 外國奉行 were promoted to the status of *wakadoshiyori*. In the state of things then prevailing, these appointment were regarded as a bold stroke of policy.

Concerning taxation, as early as 1865 a plan was conceived to create a business tax and a tax on the Dōjima Rice Exchange. This scheme did not materialise, however. In consideration of the advice tendered by Roches, to which reference has already been made, the Bakufu resumed investigations, as the result of which the imposition of a business tax on merchants and a land tax on temples, shrines, etc., was seriously considered. This scheme again failed to materialise. The drafters of a reform plan urged among other things the necessity of developing industry, exploiting mines and improving means of transport and communications. It is obvious that these proposals received the consideration of the Bakufu authorities. The proposal to establish companies was carried into execution in Ōsaka in June, 1867.

The necessity of developing the export trade was also

emphasised at this time, and the Bakufu at one time contemplated sending Tsukahara-Tajima-no-Kami, 塚原但馬守 who combined the offices of *kanjō bugyō* and *gaikoku bugyō*, to Shanghai to inspect trade conditions. Roches regarded this plan with disfavour, as he was then striving to gain for a French merchant the monopoly of the orders of the Bakufu for all imported goods, and he caused it to be abandoned. Navigation by foreign-style ships between Edo and Kōbe was initiated at this time, and schemes for colonising Ezo and Karafuto and reforming the legal and the currency systems also received attention. The conversion of *hatamoto* into farmers and merchants was also in contemplation as the reform plan shows. Altogether, the reform then attempted was of a fairly sweeping character.

These energetic attempts at reform caused much uneasiness among those who were bent on the overthrow of the Bakufu. Iwakura-Tomomi 岩倉具視, for instance, expressed the view that Yoshinobu, the Shogun, was evidently a man of decision and courage with no small aspirations, as could be gathered from his general behaviour. He might prove a formidable enemy to deal with, he said. Sakamoto-Ryūma 坂本龍馬 also referred, in an alarmist strain, to the great energy displayed by the Shogun in the direction of reforming his administration. Again, Kido-Kōin 木戸孝允 said that a new face had been put on the Bakufu's administration, and he admitted that the new military and naval system adopted by the Bakufu contained points worthy of note. The Shogun's courage and resourcefulness were by no means contemptible. Should the Imperialists allow themselves to be forestalled by the Bakufu and let slip the opportunity of restoring power to the Emperor, the Tokugawa régime might regain the prestige and influence it enjoyed in the days of its first Shogun, Iyeyasu 家康.

4. THE BAKUFU'S FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS WITH FRANCE

(a) The Yokosuka Ironworks. In many enterprises of financial and economic importance launched in the eras of Genji and Keio (1864-1867), Roches played no mean part. As the most notable of such enterprises must be mentioned the establishment of the Yokosuka Ironworks. In 1857, the Bakufu started the work of establishing an Ironworks at Akunoura, Nagasaki, and the work was completed in 1862. But as it was on too small a scale, it was incapable of repair-work for warships and other ships. Vessels requiring repairs had thus to be sent to Shanghai. A new scheme was consequently drawn up to establish an iron-foundry somewhere near Edo. It chanced that a complete set of machinery for repairing steamships was presented by the Saga clan to the Bakufu. This machinery had been purchased by Nabeshima-Naomasa 鍋島直正, the *daimyō* of the Saga clan, from Holland for an ironworks which he planned to establish at Saga. His plan was subsequently abandoned, partly because it involved heavy expenditure and partly because no person competent enough to supervise the work were available. Having obtained this machinery, the Bakufu planned to establish a dockyard and an ironworks in Mujinagaya Bay in Sagami province, and with this object in view appointed officials, and conducted a survey. This scheme had to be given up, however, because the Bakufu could not find experts skilled in such engineering work, and the machinery was left to rust. Just at this time, Kurimoto-Sebei achieved the repair work of the transport Shōkaku-maru 翔鶴丸 with the assistance of officers, engineers and mechanics from a French warship, whose services were secured through the intermediary of Roches. Thereupon, Oguri-Kōdzuke-no-Suke conceived the idea of finishing the ironworks at Mujinagaya with the help of Frenchmen. In the opinion of Roches and Admiral Jaurès, whom he approached through Kurimoto, the machinery which the Saga

clan had presented to the Bakufu was so small and of such limited horse-power that it would be incapable of anything except repair-work of small dimensions. But as the absolute need of a dockyard and an ironworks was fully recognised, it was decided to establish a new ironworks in Yokosuka Bay and a small shipbuilding yard at Yokohama, as complementary to the Yokosuka Ironworks, with that machinery installed.

Thus, a written contract bearing the joint signatures of Ono-Izumi-no-Kami 小野和泉守, a *rōjū*, and Sakai-Hida-no-Kami, a *wakadoshiyori*, was handed to the French Minister on January 29th, 1865, for the construction of the Yokosuka Ironworks. Under this scheme, one ironworks, two docks—one big and the other small—and three shipyards were to be built, together with an arsenal, in four years at a total cost of \$2,400,000.

The work on the Yokohama Shipbuilding Yard started about February, 1865, at Yoshida Shinden (somewhere near the present Yoshida-chō) and was practically finished in August, though it was not until the following year that the installation of the plant and all accessories was completed. The work of establishing the Yokosuka Ironworks began in March, 1866. On April 25th of the previous year, Shibata-Hyūga-no-Kami 柴田日向守, a *gaikoku bugyō*, left Japan for England and France by order of the Bakufu to engage experts and mechanics and to make purchases of machines and other articles. The original scheme was to leave the whole construction work in French hands, but on the advice of the French Minister, who advised the Bakufu to purchase some machines from England in order to avoid arousing her jealousy, the Bakufu decided to dispatch the Envoy to England also. A civil commotion broke out in Japan when the work was still going on, and the Bakufu had to suspend operations, the French experts being taken to Yokohama on March 6th, 1868, to protect them from personal danger. Both ironworks were taken over in April of the same year by the Meiji Government, which supplanted the Bakufu, and

the Yokosuka Ironworks was completed. It was renamed the Yokosuka Shipbuilding Yard in April, 1871.

(b) The establishment of companies. In the written memorial submitted by Roches to the Bakufu in February, 1867, the need of establishing companies was emphasised. The Bakufu itself had not been blind to this need, for two years previously it had discussed the advisability of establishing them, following foreign examples, for the development of trade and for providing better monetary facilities. The execution of this scheme was, however, in no small measure due to the advice of Roches. A representation was made in April of the same year under the joint signatures of Tsukahara-Tajima-no-Kami, who was at once *kanjō bugyō* and *gaikoku bugyō*, Oguri-Kōdzuke-no-Suke, a *kanjō bugyō*, Hattori-Chikuzen-no-Kami 服部筑前守, and Hoshino-Bungo-no-Kami 星野豊後守, acting *kanjō bugyō*, urging the Bakufu to establish companies and to issue gold notes. Two months later these proposals were put into practice. They were designed for the provision of trade equipment in connection with the opening of the port of Hyōgo and the opening of Ōsaka for foreign trade. However, as the Bakufu was unable to provide the necessary funds, amounting to 800,000 or 900,000 *ryō*, it ordered Ōsaka millionaires to establish companies, granting them the right of issuing gold notes. It is hardly necessary to say that the Bakufu's underlying motives were to develop trade and obtain funds for the opening of ports.

(c) Japan's participation in a World Exhibition in Paris. In 1867, a World Exhibition was held in Paris. In June, 1865, Roches invited Japan to take part and send her exhibits, and the Bakufu, which accepted this invitation, caused Shibata-Hyūga-no-Kami, who was then staying in Paris on a mission connected with the establishment of ironworks, to make the necessary preparations for participation, on consultation with the French Government. In April, 1866, the Bakufu issued a decree encouraging the sending of exhibits and announcing the issue of permits for those who desired to go abroad for

the prosecution of studies or for commercial purposes. It is said that the *daimyō* of Satsuma and Hizen and several merchants applied to the Bakufu for permission to send exhibits. Acting on the advice of Roches that the Bakufu should take the opportunity afforded by the Exhibition to send to France a relative of the Shogun to cultivate friendlier relations with that country, Yoshinobu sent Matsudaira-Mimbu-Dayū 松平民部大輔 (Tokugawa-Akitake 徳川昭武), who was also instructed to inspect social conditions in Europe.

(d) Loans. As already mentioned, the Bakufu built workshops at Yokohama and Yokosuka, but as it was then in serious financial straits and as its difficulties were further accentuated by the civil commotion of 1868, it was compelled to obtain a loan of \$500,000 from the Société Générale and the French Mail Steamship Company on the security of these two factories. This loan was later redeemed by the Meiji Government.

Two other loans which were urged on the Bakufu by Roches did not materialise, as Yoshinobu withheld approval: —(1) About July, 1866, Roches interviewed Ogasawara-Ikinokami at Kokura on the matter of this unsuccessful loan, and afterwards he discussed the matter with the Edo authorities. As a result, the *kanjō bugyō* was about to sign a loan contract with a French company on August 4th. (2) In a memorial presented by Roches to Yoshinobu on April 13th, 1867, the French Minister suggested that a foreign loan should be raised from France and England for increasing Japanese armaments, the region of Ezo being offered as security.

5. CONCLUSION

As the facts described in the preceding chapters show, there subsisted close ties of friendship between the Bakufu and France. Roches supported the Bakufu so stoutly that he made various recommendations in regard to the reform of its administration, while, on the other hand, many Bakufu

authorities were prone to seek French help in many things, regarding France as more trustworthy than any other country. There was no doubt that Yoshinobu, the Shogun, trusted Roches, but he never intended to repress the anti-Bakufu elements with the armed and financial aid of France. He merely sought his advice as a help to his administration. This is clear from the fact that, in the spring of 1868, the Shogun rejected the earnest advice of Roches that he try to regain his power, and in the further fact that he refused the French offer of a loan. The Shogun held Japan's relations with foreign countries of greater moment than the Bakufu's relations with Satsuma and Chōshū.

In contrast with the Bakufu's close relations with France, the Satsuma and Chōshū clans were in close relationship with Britain. According to Roches, the Satsuma clan secured from Britain a promise of valuable help in connection with its revolt against the Bakufu. The author of 'The Life of Sir Harry Parkes' says, on the other hand: "The French Minister, Mr. Léon Roches, was full of the peculiar French patriotism, so undisguisedly selfish, that has not seldom been a mark of French diplomacy in the East. He appears to have aimed at the creation of a sort of French protectorate of the Shogunate." Judging from the Eastern policy of France at the time and also from the general behaviour of Roches, it seems impossible to dismiss the above comment as entirely misdirected. But when it is remembered that he left the matter of naval training to Britain, chose to give Britain a share in the sales to the Bakufu of machinery for the Yokosuka Ironworks, and advised the Bakufu to raise foreign loans both in France and in England, it seems that Roches could not entirely ignore Britain.

If, in those critical days, Satsuma had been misled into calling in the aid of Britain in achieving the work of Restoration and the Bakufu had sought the help of France in curtailing the powers of the *daimyō*, such ill-advised courses might have culminated not only in serious social confusion but in the interference of Britain and France in the domestic

affairs of Japan. It was for fear of such a contingency arising that Yoshinobu acted as he did. His sincerity of purpose deserves praise.

Setting apart his underlying motives, Roches often laid his constructive views before the Bakufu and helped it in various ways. The result was that big reforms were effected in military, political and economic matters, and a new face was put on the Bakufu's administration. Many economic measures adopted in the closing years of the Bakufu were traceable to his initiative or recommendation. In short, the rôle played by the French Minister in the formulation of the measures by which the Bakufu coped with the critical situation of the time was by no means negligible. At the same time, it is noteworthy that Oguri-Kōdzuke-no-Suke, one of the leading figures in the Bakufu, was in close touch with Roches.

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